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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the reasons behind the differences in the use and provision of different 
types of working time flexibility options of companies across European labour markets with a 
special focus on the country differences. Competing theories on the cross-country variances of 
labour market flexibility are tested to examine whether labour market institutions are the driv-
ing forces of working time flexibility practices in comparison to other factors such as eco-
nomic, labour market structures and cycles. It uses a multi-level model which enables exami-
nation of companies in the context of the country in which it is embedded, while including 
both company and country level characteristics in the explanatory model. In this paper, the 
issue of flexibility is addressed broadly, thus, it perceives labour market flexibility as a 
method used for the needs of employees as well as for those of employers. In addition, the 
“flexible firm” approach is taken and various flexibility options are considered to be bundles 
of arrangements with similar latent characteristics and not as separate entities. Based on this, 
the paper explains the differences between countries where there are more worker-oriented 
working time flexibility options to those where flexibility practices are more company-
oriented. The data used here is the European Establishment Survey of Working-Time and 
Work-life Balance (ESWT) from the European Foundation of the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions. This survey covers over 21,000 establishments in 21 EU member states 
for the years 2004/2005. The outcomes of the analyses show that indeed institutions, such as 
employment protection regulations or centralization of bargaining explain the differences 
across countries in their variance in working time practices. In addition, the strength of unions 
is associated to countries where companies use more worker friendly working time options 
and less company-oriented options. Labour market situations and structure of the economy 
such as deindustrialization or female labour market participation patterns also explain the 
country differences in working time practices. However, for the worker-oriented flexibility it 
seems that institutions are more important whereas for the company-oriented flexibility op-
tions, economic and labour market situations are the driving source.  
Zusammenfassung 
In der vorliegenden Analyse werden die Hintergründe für den unterschiedlichen Einsatz ver-
schiedener Modelle zur flexiblen Arbeitszeitgestaltung von Unternehmen in europäischen 
Arbeitsmärkten untersucht. Das besondere Interesse liegt auf den Unterschieden zwischen den 
einzelnen Ländern. Dabei werden konkurrierende Theorien über Varianzen der Arbeitsmarkt-
flexibilität zwischen den Ländern getestet um zu untersuchen, ob institutionelle Arbeitsmarkt-
regelungen die treibenden Kräfte für unterschiedliche Anwendungen flexibler Arbeitszeiten 
sind verglichen mit anderen Einflussfaktoren wie bspw. Arbeitsmarktstrukturen und Konjunk-
turzyklen. Hierzu wird ein Mehr-Ebenen-Modell geschätzt, welches die Betrachtung eines 
Unternehmens in dessen jeweiligem Landeskontext ermöglicht; dazu werden Unternehmens- 
und Ländercharakteristika als erklärende Variablen herangezogen.  
In dieser Analyse wird Flexibilität weit gefasst. In diesem Sinne wird Arbeitsmarktflexibilität 
als eine Methode verstanden, die sowohl den Bedürfnissen der Arbeitnehmer als auch der 
Arbeitgeber Rechnung tragen kann. Zusätzlich wird der „flexible firm“-Ansatz aufgegriffen 
und unterschiedliche Optionen für Flexibilitätspolitiken werden jeweils als Bündel unter-
schiedlicher Arrangements mit ähnlichen spezifischen Wirkungsweisen gesehen und nicht als 
voneinander getrennte Ansätze. Darauf aufbauend wird der Unterschied zwischen Ländern 
mit einer eher arbeitnehmerorientierten flexiblen Arbeitszeitregelung und Ländern, in denen 
die Flexibilitätspraxis eher unternehmensorientiert ist, erklärt. Die verwendeten Daten beru-
hen auf dem„European Establishment Survey of Working-Time and Work-life Balance 
(ESWT)“ der Europäischen Stiftung zur Verbesserung der Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen 
in Dublin. Diese Erhebung umfasst für die Jahre 2004/2005 über 21.000 Unternehmen in 21 
EU-Mitgliedsstaaten.  
Die Ergebnisse der Analyse zeigen, dass institutionelle Regelungen wie Kündigungsschutzre-
gelungen oder die Zentralisierung von Tarifverhandlungen tatsächlich die Unterschiede zwi-
schen Ländern bezüglich der Varianz von Arbeitszeitregelungen erklären. Hinzu kommt, dass 
sich in den Ländern, in denen Unternehmen eher arbeitnehmerfreundliche und weniger unter-
nehmensorientierte Arbeitszeitmodelle anwenden, eher stärkere Gewerkschaften finden las-
sen.. Weitere Erklärungen für Unterschiede bei Arbeitszeitregelungen zwischen den Ländern 
sind die Situation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und wirtschaftsstrukturelle Faktoren wie der Grad der 
Deindustrialisierung oder der Arbeitsmarktpartizipation von Frauen.  
Als Fazit kann festgestellt werden, dass für eine arbeitnehmerorientierte Flexibilität institutio-
nelle Regelungen wichtiger sind, wohingegen für unternehmensorientierte Flexibilitätspoliti-
ken  die wirtschaftliche Lage  und die Lage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt die treibenden Kräfte sind. 
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1  Introduction 
With labour market flexibility persisting to gain attention as method of adaptation for 
both workers and companies, there is much interest in trying to find out what explains the 
differences in flexibility across countries (for example Salvanes, 1997; Regini, 2000; EC, 
2006; EC, 2007a; Muffels et. al, 2008). Some literature focuses on labour market institutions 
asserting that they are determinant factors of flexibility. For example, Salvanes(1997) note 
that it is technological change and institutions, such as employment protection legislation and 
centralization of wage bargaining, that explain for the differences between countries in their 
labour market dynamics. Others turn to other explanations such as socio-economic structures 
pressures and cultural changes both in society and production (Mishra, 1999; Standing, 1999; 
Brewster et al., 1997; Evans, 2000; Atkinson, 1987). These explanations of country differ-
ences are key issues that need to be addressed to develop policies or environments to facilitate 
the use of flexibility practices with positive outcomes, and restrict those with negative effects. 
This paper is an addition to this ongoing discussion and aims to provide explanations of varie-
ties of flexibility practices across European companies focusing on the use of working time 
flexibility.  
This paper is written as a part of a larger project which examines the working time flexi-
bility of European companies, their determinants and implications. In this project, labour 
market flexibility is defined in a broader sense, thus including flexibility needs of workers as 
well as those for companies. As companies adapt to business cycles and facilitate their other 
needs through the use of labour market flexibility strategies, workers adapt to their life cycles 
and their needs through it. This notion is now widely accepted and the European Commission 
addresses this issue in its Joint Employment Report and its new Flexicurity approach, calling 
for an adequate methods to enhance flexibility for both workers and employers (EC, 2007b) 
that is “capable of quickly and effectively mastering new productive needs and skills and 
about facilitating the combination of work and private responsibilities (EC, 2007c).” In addi-
tion, this project takes the “flexible firm” approach where various flexibility options are con-
sidered to be bundles of arrangements with similar latent characteristics and not separate enti-
ties1. The project asks four major questions. The first is how company level working time 
practices in Europe can be examined. In a previous paper, it is tested whether numerical flexi-
bility arrangements can be grouped into categories, and if so, what types of groupings can be 
found. It is found that flexibility arrangements can be grouped and distinguished into those for 
workers and for companies, empirically, based on behaviours of establishments and their ac-
tual work practices (Chung, 2007; Chung et. al, 2007).  
The second question addressed in the project is over explaining the differences between 
companies in their use of flexibility practices based on the framework derived. In Chung 
                                                 
1 More elaboration on this is found in section 3 of this paper. 
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(forthcoming), it is shown that the line of business the establishment is in, that is, the sector as 
well as size, composition of the work force, work load fluctuations, existence of working time 
agreements, existence of employee representatives, provision of work life balance facilities, 
economic situation of the company all were influential factors in explaining the extent to 
which companies use working time options2. In addition, in some countries being within the 
public sector also has an effect on flexibility behaviours of companies, while not in others. 
Also, countries explain for no more than 20 percent of the variance between companies in 
their use of working time flexibility arrangements and this variance is smaller for the country 
differences one can find in company-oriented working time flexibility option take up (Chung, 
forthcoming). The limitation to this second paper is that although cross-national variances are 
found, the paper does not go on to explain why such cross-national differences exist. In other 
words, the question still remains which country level characteristics can account for the rea-
son companies behave differently in different countries. This brings us to the third part of the 
larger project and the topic of this paper, thus answering the question why there are country 
variances in the practices of working time flexibility examined in company levels. In this pa-
per, a multi-level model is used to tackle this question. Through the use of a multi-level 
model, we can find the pure country difference, that is, the differences between countries 
when other characteristics of companies such as sector, size, composition of its workforce and 
others are controlled for. In other words, we explain the differences between working time 
flexibility practices of European companies when we presume that all other characteristics of 
the company are equal, and the only difference is that they are located in different countries. 
 This paper is structured as follows. In the next section (section 2) this paper explains 
more about company level flexibility practices and the relevance of the country level on these 
practices. In the same section, the paper examines the competing theories on cross-national 
variations in labour market flexibility to arrive at the main hypotheses. Section 3 provides 
information over the data and methods used in this paper, i.e. we operationalize and describe 
the country level independent indicators as well as the dependent variable derived from our 
main data set the European Establishment Survey on Working Time (ESWT). The outcomes 
of the multi-level regression analysis follow in section 4. Lastly (section 5), we arrive at some 
conclusions, policy implications and issues for further research. 
 
                                                 
2 More elaboration on this is found in section 3 of this paper. 
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2 Country differences in labour market flexibility 
2.1 Company level practices and the country level 
The practices of companies, that is, the use and/or provision of flexibility options within 
companies are important in examining labour market flexibility of countries. Not only do 
these practices show the actual take up behaviours of firms but also they provide information 
on the actual availability of flexibility options for workers. Employees themselves in most 
cases cannot autonomously choose various flexibility options and are restricted to those which 
are used and provided within the companies they work in. In this sense we can see company 
level flexibility practices as the final availability of working time flexibility options for work-
ers which “sets out the possibility and limits of the employees to adapt their actual working 
hours to their personal needs and wishes”(Riedmann et al., 2006: 1).  
The relationship between country level institutions and company behaviour is rather com-
plex. On one side companies are bounded by legal restrictions on the use of various working 
time flexibilities such as the definition of the normal working hour, over-time and unusual 
hours etc., and the limitations to the use of such options. These regulations are mostly from 
laws of the country, however can also be derived from sectoral agreements as well as EU di-
rectives3. It is not always the case that companies will stick to this agreement and might use 
flexibilities though opt-out clauses or out side the legal boundaries4. Companies may also not 
use any flexibility options at all despite given the opportunity. On the other side, companies 
are bounded by compulsory leaves and other work-life balance oriented working time options, 
which can also be set in the national or sectoral level, as well as EU level. However, for vari-
ous needs, such as recruiting and maintaining skilled workers, companies can also provide 
more than the legal requirement on work-life balance arrangements. Through empirical data 
on establishments, Den Dulk (2001) and Den Dulk et. al. (2005) show how in countries where 
advanced statutory provisions are present, employers are not likely to introduce additional 
work-family arrangements. Rather in countries where public provisions are near absent, this 
leads to larger employer involvement and employers introduce workplace arrangements ac-
cording to their specific needs. In other words, companies choose their own flexibility strate-
gies and act rather autonomously from their institutional environments (Bredgaard and Tros, 
forthcoming). In fact, previous study shows that countries explain at most 20 percent of the 
variance between companies’ flexibility arrangement take up and even less when we consider 
take up of flexibility options for employer’s needs (Chung, forthcoming). 
                                                 
3 The EU working time directive passed in 1993 sets the maximum working hour to 48 hours a week, as well as 
regulations on rest, holidays and night shifts. However, it also includes the individual opt-out clause where 
workers can be asked to work more than 48 hours a week given that they sign an individual agreement with 
their employers (ETUC: http://www.etuc.org/a/504). 
4 In a research by the TUC, in the case for UK, two-thirds of workers who have worked longer than 48 hours 
have not signed the opt-out agreement (TUC, 2005). 
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However, it is also not the case where companies are completely independent of the influ-
ences from the country level. Although countries do not determine the behaviours of their 
firms completely, cross-national variances in company behaviour do exist. The variance in 
company behaviour explained by countries can result from numerous factors. This can in-
clude institutional environments, such as law and policies on labour markets, industrial rela-
tion related aspects, labour market and economic market situations, cycles and structures, as 
well as various cultural aspects such as gender division of work, general societal attitude to-
wards the issues of work-life balance etc. Unfortunately, there are no specific lists of factors 
that are agreed upon in this field of research to be used as the major influential factors. The 
one used in related fields deals with labour market institution effects on labour market and 
economic performances (for example Layard et al, 1991; Scarpetta 1996; Nickell, 1997; 
Elmshov at al. 1998). This list of institutions include employment protection legislation, un-
ion strength, bargaining coordination and centralization, tax wedges, unemployment benefit 
scheme generosity, active labour market policy, etc. However, not all of the institutions listed 
are relevant for this paper, due to differences in the variable explained. For this reason, we use 
some of the relevant institutional factors used in the previous studies and add additional fac-
tors from other major studies that examine country differences in flexibility, more specifically 
working time flexibility. 
 
2.2   Review of literature on cross-national variance in labour market flexibility 
2.2.1  Labour market institutions 
 
Labour market regulations 
Regulations on labour markets, such as laws on employment protection legislations, 
working time regulations etc, affect the practices of flexibilities in the company level through 
allowing or restricting the use of certain arrangements through law or policies. Kalleberg 
(2001) argues that the likelihood of organizations to utilize numerical flexibility strategies 
depends on the country’s regulatory regime. It has been shown through the example of several 
countries, that establishments would adapt numerical flexibility strategies as response to eco-
nomic pressures in countries where national institutions involve few restrictions on manage-
rial decision (Smith et al, 1995; Toharia and Malo, 2000; Kalleberg, 2001). Also, more spe-
cifically, examined cross-nationally, strict regulations on the cost of firing regular workers has 
been shown to have somewhat of a positive relationships with the use of temporary contracts 
due to the fact that they can be used as substitutes (Grubbs and Wells, 1993; Dolado et al., 
2001; Booth et al., 2002; OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004; Chung, 2005; Polavieja, 2006). How-
ever, there are studies that suggest the contrary. Based on the cross-national comparison study 
of Australia and New Zealand, Allan et al. (1998) show that despite the substantial difference 
in the system of labour regulations between the two countries, there were only minor differ-
ences in working time arrangements. This outcome suggests that systems of labour regula-
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tions may not be a critical factor in determining the use of particular working time arrange-
ments.  Brewster et al (2000) also find that despite the fact that the country is a strong deter-
minant in the use of flexible arrangements within a company, there are little correlation be-
tween legal regulation and the movement towards flexibility. They note how within each set 
of national laws there are differences in the way different sectors and different organisations 
use flexibility. This could be explained through perhaps organisational cultures, experiences 
and expectations (Horrell and Rubery, 1991; Brewster et al., 2000: 190) 
There are several ways in which labour market regulations can affect the flexibility prac-
tices of companies. In addition, we can distinguish the effects of regulations on the external 
numerical flexibility and those on working time arrangements. In regards to regulations of 
external flexibilities, there can be substitution or complimentary effects (Kalleberg, 2001; 
Cappelli and Neumark, 2004). In countries where numerical flexibility cannot be achieved 
through easy firing and hiring workers, based on deregulated institutions, we can expect that 
companies may need to enhance flexibility through use of flexible working hours, thus 
through working time. In this respect we might expect a substitution effect between regula-
tions on firing workers and working time practices. That is, in countries where there are strin-
gent employment protection regulations, especially those for regular workers, there may be a 
need to use working time flexibility arrangements especially those for companies’ needs. 
However, when we consider that companies also use temporary contracts as substitutes in 
cases where the costs in firing workers are high, the relationship between employment protec-
tion regulations and working time flexibility becomes more complicated. On the other hand, 
we can also expect the opposite effect, where flexible countries are more flexible in all ways, 
externally and internally. This implies a complimentary relationship between regulations of 
firing workers and the use of various working time flexibility options. If there are more strin-
gent rules on the working time regulations within the country, for example the definition and 
the restriction on the use of over time and unusual hours, we can predict that companies will 
not be able to use flexible arrangements as much. If there are legal regulations on the provi-
sion of leave schemes and worker’s right for flexible working hours to fit work with other 
responsibilities, we can expect companies to provide more options for workers’ work life bal-
ance needs due to their compulsory nature. On the other hand, even in countries where there 
are not much state regulations, employers will still be involved in providing worker’s work 
life balance. However, in these cases there may be more variance within the country. 
 
Labour Relations aspects 
Union strength 
Union can be against the use of flexible options for companies’ needs due to their nega-
tive impact on the working conditions of workers and also because they are destructive to 
industrial relations through their effect on segmentation of the workers (Delsen, 1995: 96). 
Since union membership is usually centred on permanent full-time workers, and flexible 
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workers have different behavioural patterns and attitudes, rise in atypical jobs, such as tempo-
rary contracts as well as part-time in this case, may result in decline in union membership 
(Delsen, 1995).  In addition flexible workers can be seen as competitors to unionized workers 
(Kalleberg et al., 2003). Historically, unions have been against long-working hours and over 
time (Pillenger, 2006; Eiro online, 1999; Eiro online, 2004) as well as irregular hours or un-
healthy working time patterns such as nights shifts (Pillenger, 2006). We can expect stronger 
unions to limit the development of flexible work contracts as well as various working time 
flexibility that are detrimental to the working conditions of workers. Similarly, employers 
might be able to introduce flexible contracts and flexible working arrangements that are for 
the needs of the company more easily where the bargaining power of unions is weak. Deyo 
(1997) shows that where union power and thus the opposition against unfavourable flexibility 
are weak, countries were able to adopt numerical flexibility strategies to reduce short-term 
costs (Deyo, 1997; Kalleberg, 2001). Empirically, establishments with low union membership 
rates have been shown to have higher probability of using temporary agency work, short-term 
hires and part-time work (Houseman, 2001). Low union membership has also been linked to 
higher intensity of the use of part time work and temporary workers (Abraham, 1990; 
Houseman, 2001). The causality of this relationship can go both ways. The establishments, 
and over all countries where union density is low and where union power is not strong, the 
expansion of the use of atypical work may increase easier. However, it may also be that since 
in many cases, workers on atypical contracts are not unionized, this may decrease union 
membership. Kalleberg et al. (2003) argues that the use of flexible staffing arrangements 
hampers unionizing efforts but also the presence of unions dissuades employers from utilizing 
these arrangements (Kalleberg et al., 2003: 547). There can also be dilemmas inside unions 
regarding the use of non-standard work arrangements, since they can be used as buffers to 
protect regular workers from lay offs (Oslen, 2005). In this case, union membership and use 
of atypical contracts will coincide. 
On the other hand, companies in countries with strong unions may provide more work-
life balance flexibility options.  Despite the fact that unions are against the expansion of flexi-
bility which are detrimental to workers, they note the importance of working time flexibility 
in balancing work and life for workers. ETUC has been actively arguing for the flexible use 
of working time for the needs of workers to combine work with other responsibilities and in-
terests (for example see Pillenger for ETUC, 2006). Also, in their response to the European 
Commission’s Green Paper on modernizing labour law, ETUC also emphasize the importance 
of the development of working time flexibility, instead of just implementing external flexibil-
ity (ETUC, 2007). In their report on working time, TUC has also argued that flexible working 
should be extended to all workers through stronger regulations (Fagen et al for TUC, 2006).  
Union membership has been linked with access to more flexible working time arrangements. 
The TUC (2005), based on the UK Labour Force Survey Micro data, shows how union mem-
bers are almost twice as likely to have flexible working time arrangements to facilitate their 
work life balance than non-members. Based on such outcomes, we can expect countries with 
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high union memberships to have more work life balance options available in their establish-
ments on average. However, this relationship between union membership and greater access 
to work life balance flexibility options might only hold true within countries where generally 
unions are not strong and membership rates are not high, such as the UK.  
 
Negotiation structure: centralization of bargaining 
Centralization of bargaining can be related to the ability of workers and employers to ad-
vance their interests. From the structural asymmetry in the labour market due to the control 
over the means of productions, employers have much more ways of promoting their interest 
compared to those of the workers (Offe, 1985; Traxler, 2003). This is also related to the class-
specific preferences between individual (unorganized) and collective (organized) bargaining. 
Employers will prefer individual unorganized negotiations, whereas workers will prefer or-
ganized collective negotiation to increase their strategic capacities against one another (Trax-
ler, 1995; 2003). However, it has also been argued that a more centralized and coordinated 
bargaining system can deal with the externalities by internalizing the costs that derive from it, 
compared to a decentralized, uncoordinated system. When wage bargaining is centralized and 
there is a high coverage rate of the bargaining outcomes, it is less clear who will benefit and 
be harmed from the consequences of various bargaining outcomes (OECD, 1997a:65). In ad-
dition, compared to single employer bargaining, multi-employer bargaining tends to take bar-
gaining out of competition (Traxler et al, 2001; Traxler, 2003). This would mean that cen-
tralization of negotiation would have effects on the regulations or agreements on the use of 
working time flexibility, thus affecting the use of flexibility options indirectly. The flexicurity 
countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark can be seen as examples of countries that 
have highly coordinated social partners with relatively coordinated centralized bargaining 
systems who have introduced various flexibility measures in the labour market to tackle the 
problem of unemployment (See Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Madsen, 2003, 2004; Wilthagen 
and Tros, 2004). Traxler argues that in the era of internationalization, only multi-employer, 
thus centralized bargaining can enable social partners to negotiate basic compromises within 
the framework of an organized industrial relations system (Traxler, 2003: 145).  
Negotiation structures have also been connected to the working time patterns of the coun-
try (O’Reilly and Spee, 1998; Anxo and O’Reilly, 2000; Bredgaard and Tros, forthcoming). 
O’Reilly and Spee (1998) derive a statist, negotiated, externally constrained working time 
regime depending on the negotiation structures of the countries. In the statist working time 
regime, statutory regulations are the key element governing the use of flexibility and working 
time patterns and collective bargaining has a restrictive role. These countries have a more 
normalized type of working hours. The countries that can be included here are Spain and 
France. On the contrary, negotiated working time regime typologies are where there is a 
strong tradition of negotiation between social partners and the state regulatory system only 
provides a basic framework. Examples of this system are Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ger-
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many, Austria and the Netherlands. Lastly, externally constrained working time is where there 
is free collective bargaining and working time is distributed over a wider spectrum. The coun-
tries included here are Ireland and the UK (Anxo and O’Reilly 2000). This theory is on the 
cross-national variance in the distribution of working hours, not necessarily the use of various 
working time flexibility arrangements. However, we can expect similar effects of negotiation 
structures on the use of working time flexibility options. Such as, companies in countries 
where working time is distributed over a wide spectrum to make use of more options, and visa 
versa. In addition, Bredgaard and Tros (forthcoming) find that decentralisation is an important 
precondition for companies in taking up flexicurity policies. In the workplaces in which actors 
on the company or work place level is the main initiator of the introduction of arrangements, 
there are more arrangements than in workplaces in which the national level actors such as the 
government is the main initiator. Based on this, we can predict that when the bargaining level 
is at the decentralized level companies may use more working time flexibility options.  
 
 
2.2.2 Economic and labour market situation and structures 
 
Labour market situation  
Labour market situations of the country can also affect what types of options companies 
take up in terms of flexibility. When labour market situations are favourable towards the 
workers, such as when labour demand is high while there is not enough supply, companies 
may have to introduce more work life balance need driven flexibility options to recruit and 
maintain their workforce. On the other hand, workers can be pressured into taking up various 
employers’ need driven working time flexibility options, when the labour market situations 
are favourable towards the employers, thus when the country has high unemployment. In both 
cases, labour market situations would affect the bargaining positions of workers and employ-
ers and thus indirectly affect the use of working time flexibility. Houseman (2001), using a 
US based study on establishment’s behaviour of taking up flexible staffing arrangement such 
as part time work and temporary employment, found that employers are more likely to de-
mand workers in flexible arrangements when the market demand is tight. On the other hand, 
workers prefer regular arrangements and are less likely to accept flexible arrangements when 
the market supply is tight (Houseman, 2001:163). However, there is also evidence that labour 
shortages may drive companies to use more flexible working time options to adapt to the 
situation. For example, in Denmark, to counter labour shortages companies use of flexible 
working time arrangements that allow for extension of working hours (EIRO online, 2006).   
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Economic globalization 
Economic globalisation is another factor that is perceived to increase the need for flexibil-
ity in the labour market. There are many ways in which globalization affects the labour mar-
ket. First, liberalization of the world economy or countries’ integration into the world econ-
omy increases competition of national economies. This leads to changes in production sys-
tems of firms as well as changes in labour demand. ‘Lean’ production or ‘just-in-time’ inven-
tory are the new types of production systems that adjust production and the labour force to 
labour market fluctuations more quickly than before, resulting in growth in non-standard 
work (Mishra, 1999: 25). Also, increases in the freedom of capital to move to other produc-
tion sites mean that workers have to compete against low wage workers in other countries, 
thus decreasing the demand for low-skilled labour. The competition for product and capital 
market also brings about an increase in the elasticity of wages and labour demand, especially 
for workers that can be substituted by foreign workers (Rodrik, 1997; Sapir, 2000). The bar-
gaining power of labour weakens when elasticity of labour increases especially in periods of 
chronic unemployment. This decrease in bargaining power enables capital to achieve flexibil-
ity in many ways, including employing workers on atypical contracts such as temporary con-
tracts, involuntary part-time work as well as using unusual hours and overtime (Mishra, 1999; 
Rodrik, 1997). Based on this, we can assume that globalization, or increased market integra-
tion into the global market will increase companies’ needs and bargaining power to use flexi-
bility options that are for companies’ needs. On the other hand, due to the respective loss of 
worker’s bargaining power, this may have negative impact on the provision of work life bal-
ance options to workers.  
In addition, we can expect economic globalization, when in the form of foreign invest-
ment or foreign owned companies, to affect the work place culture of the companies within 
the host country. For example, multi-national companies may keep their human resource 
management cultures, which will include working time practices and provision of work life 
balance options, regardless of where the establishment is located. Coller (1996) finds that 
head offices of multinational companies indirectly deals with the local offices to ensure a de-
gree of consistency of companies between different countries and different institutional envi-
ronments. This is more so the case when the host country has weaker institutions (Muller, 
1998)5.  
For both globalization and labour market situations, there may be a reverse causality rela-
tionship. In countries where the use of flexibility is prevalent, this may facilitate globalization 
and labour demand, although it may also make the environment unfavourable for both. 
 
                                                 
5 See International Journal of Human Resource Management Vol.9 No.4 for an in dept discussion on this issue. 
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Prevalence of sectors and economic structure: 
The prevalence of a certain industry or sector within the economy can also be a factor that 
determines the country’s culture in the use of flexibility arrangements. In other words, when 
there are high proportions of sectors that use more flexibility arrangements, this may change 
the culture of companies within the whole country. For example, prevalence of the public 
sector may effect the provision of work life balance related working time flexibility options 
within companies. Many previous empirical studies on companies’ provision of work life bal-
ance options point out that on average public companies provide more arrangements than pri-
vate companies (Evans, 2001; OECD, 2001; Plantenga and Remery, 2005). The reasons are 
because public sectors are less prone to market pressures and may employ a larger proportion 
of women. In addition public sectors are seen to be under more pressure to take gender equal-
ity norms into account and to set precedence for other companies to follow (Evans, 2001; 
OECD, 2001; Plantenga and Remery, 2005). For this reason public sector organizations often 
take the lead in adopting work-family arrangements (Den Dulk, 2001; Evans, 2001; Den Dulk 
et al., 2005). From this, we can expect in countries where there are high shares of public com-
panies, the whole working culture of the country may change into that which is similar to the 
public sector, which would be in most cases more worker friendly. This would especially be 
the case where there are large proportion of public companies and large coverage of collective 
agreements. Public companies may drive how the agreements are shaped, which would then 
be applicable to the whole sector to affect even the private sector companies. It has been 
shown using the ESWT data that the effect of being within the public sector on the provision 
of work-life balance options is different across countries (Chung, forthcoming). This different 
effect of public sectors observed across countries may be due to the prevalence of the public 
sector within the country. Where there is a large public sector there may not be a big differ-
ences between public and private companies, whereas when the public sector is small, they 
may be distinguishable in their practices of working time flexibility of private companies.  
We can expect somewhat of a similar effect for the size of the service sector or through 
the process of deindustrialization. Services sector generally use more flexibility arrangements 
than industry sectors (Anxo et al., 2007a, 2007b; Chung et al., 2007; Kümmerling and 
Lehndorff, 2007). Also, the growth of flexible working patterns has been linked with the 
growth of the services sector (Houseman, 1995; Kalleberg, 2000). The increase of service 
sector or the process of deindustrialization may change the work culture to increase the use of 
flexibility practices throughout the economy, to the non-services sector as well.  
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 Gender regime: female labour participation as a proxy for gender work division 
culture 
Another aspect we need to take in to consideration is the cross-national variances in the 
gender division of work and the participation of women in the labour market (for example, 
Lewis, 1992; Ostner and Lewis, 1995; Gornick, Meyers and Ross, 1998; Sainsbury, 1999; 
Crompton 2001; Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2001; MacDonald, 2004).  Lewis (1992) critiqued 
the welfare state regime typologies for not incorporating the relationship between unpaid as 
well as paid work and welfare. She noted that when we take the prevalence of the traditional 
male-breadwinner family model into account, we can arrive at three types of countries. They 
are the historically strong male breadwinner, the modified male-breadwinner and lastly the 
dual-breadwinner societies (Lewis, 1992). Expanding this idea, Crompton (2001) examined 
the earner-carer divide throughout countries to derive models that range from traditional to 
less traditional, depending on who is responsible for income and care. Income responsibilities 
can fall either on the male or female on full or part-time basis, and care responsibilities can be 
addressed by the male, female, both, the state or the market. The Nordic countries have the 
dual-earner and state-carer model, while the US is an example where there is a dual-earner 
and market-carer. The gender division of work or the gender regime may be a deciding factor 
in explaining the differences between countries on their use of working time flexibility. This 
is especially important, for one of the main purposes of working time flexibility is to balance 
work and life of workers. In countries where the dual earner model is the norm, there are more 
women in the labour market. It is highly likely that in these countries, there will be more 
working time arrangements that are worker oriented or that are more suitable to balance work 
and life, such as flexible working schedules or various leaves. This may be different depend-
ing on whether if it is the market or the state/society that provides the care. 
The relationship between women in the labour market and more work life balance options 
in the country can go both ways. In countries where the gender work-care division is more 
equal and women’s participation in the labour market is the norm, it is likely that labour mar-
kets are made to be more women or family friendly. Thus in these countries the country in 
general and specifically companies may (have to) provide more work life balance options. It 
may also be the case that countries where there are more work-life balance options women are 
able to participate in the labour market easier thus increasing the labour market participation 
of women.  
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3 Data sets and methods 
In this section, we operationalize the various theories of country variance of working time 
flexibility and provide some descriptive data of the variables used in this paper. Before that, 
we examine the main data set used in this paper, namely the ESWT data set, and derive the 
dependent variable used for the analysis of the paper. 
 
3.1 Establishment Survey on Working Time and Work-life Balance and working time 
flexibility 
The ESWT (Establishment Survey on Working Time and Work-life Balance) provides us 
with the information on the establishment level of various arrangements that are created 
within the firm to enhance the internal flexibility and to adapt to workers’ preferences for 
combining work and non-work activities. It covers 21 EU member states EU15 and six new 
member states (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia) and the sur-
vey was conducted between 2004 and 2005. It includes 21,000 establishments where person-
nel managers and, if available, employee representatives were interviewed. This survey cov-
ers a wide arrange of arrangements of which data are not available in other sources. Of the 
information gathered within the ESWT in the analysis the following arrangements as listed in 
Table 1 are used6.  
In this paper we take the “flexible firm” approach. In other words, our interest is in the 
organization of working time flexibility practices of companies, not in their take up of single 
arrangements separately, but in how firms use and combine the various arrangements. Flexi-
bility is not just a one dimension matter which can be measured as more or less flexibility, but 
is multi-dimensional and it is important to see what type of flexibility is developed in addition 
to the extent of it (Kalleberg, 2001; Gareis and Korte, 2002; Chung, 2007; Chung et al, 2007).  
Also, as there are numerous strategies companies and workers can use to make work more 
flexible (Atkinson, 1984), there can be several substitution as well as complimentary effects. 
This means that the examination of the use of a single arrangement or several arrangements 
separately will not show us the complete picture of how companies behave in regards to the 
needs of flexibility. What is important is not only the use of a certain arrangement, but the 
combination of various arrangements or various types of flexibility. 
 
                                                 
6 We have gathered as much information as possible concerning the arrangements used in the company, in re-
gards to flexibility options. This may imply that some of the arrangements can be considered as having similar 
characteristics. However, the choice of variables was made based on their substantive significance as an inde-
pendent and a different type of option serving different needs. 
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Table 1 : Working time flexibility arrangements used in the analysis 
 
 
Main Category Subcategories Information a Proportion b Note 
Part-time work - Use O  
Right to reduce 
working hours 
- Available X 
The possibility of full-time employees 
to go to a part-time contract 7 
Unusual hours  Use X 
Includes working at night, Satur-
days and Sundays. 
Shift work - Use O 
Changing working hours due to the 
nature of the job 
Flexible working 
hours 
 Use O 
Employees have possibility to adapt 
the time when they begin or end their 
daily work 
Overtime - Use O 
Any overtime since the beginning of 
this year 
For care or ill-
ness in family 
Available X 
For education Available X Long-term leave 
For other purpo-
ses 
Available X 
Paid and unpaid 
Retirement sche-
mes 
Phased retire-
ment 
Available X 
only asked to companies 
 with 50+ workers8 
a: Use questions were asked whether the company has used or is using the arrangement, available questions were 
asked whether the company has or make such arrangements available for its workers.  
b: x indicates no information, o indicates that there is information on the proportion of workers in such arrange-
ments 
 
 
                                                 
7 This is measured as “can get appropriate job quickly” “has to wait for some time” as there being a possibility, 
and “possible only exceptionally” “no chance” as there not being a possibility. This question was asked di-
vided into skilled workers and unskilled workers and here the average score for both was used.    
8 Companies without workers who are 50 or older are considered not to have this arrangement. 
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Here we run a factor analysis which groups numerous indicators according to their latent 
characteristics. A varimax orthogonal method was used using information to derive at two 
factors (see Annex 1 for outcome table)9. The first factor was named flexibility for workers 
and the second flexibility for companies. This naming is based on the high loadings of the 
arrangements on each factor, such as the three leave schemes for the first, and unusual hours, 
overtime and shift work on the second. The arrangements which are considered to be flexibil-
ity arrangements that can facilitate the needs of both sides load in both of the factors. The 
factor scores for each company are then used as dependent variables indicating the two com-
ponents of companies’ working time flexibility practices, the worker’s working time flexibil-
ity component and the company’s working time flexibility component. A graphical represen-
tation of these components can be somewhat as in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Latent components of working time flexibility, the dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Here we use an exploratory factor analysis method, due to that one of the hypothesis that is being tested is 
whether indeed working time flexibility options can indeed distinguished into those for workers and compa-
nies. Also firstly we tested to see whether the two factors were correlated, but was found that there was no 
high correlations between the two, thus we chose a varimax solution. 
 16
Table 2: Country scores for working time flexibility components10 
 
 
Working time flexibility for 
workers 
Working time flexibility for 
companies 
Belgium  0.07 0.19 
Denmark  0.81 - 0.11 
Germany  - 0.03 0.25 
Greece  - 0.60 - 0.82 
Spain  - 0.37 - 0.46 
France  - 0.12 0.13 
Ireland  - 0.08 0.13 
Italy  - 0.30 - 0.28 
Luxembourg  - 0.29 - 0.06 
Netherlands  0.37 0.03 
Austria  - 0.35 0.11 
Portugal  - 0.48 - 0.90 
Finland  0.95 0.06 
Sweden  0.56 0.29 
United Kingdom  0.07 0.43 
Cyprus  - 0.54 - 0.37 
Latvia  - 0.06 0.12 
Hungary  0.08 - 0.73 
Poland  0.71 - 0.27 
Slovenia  - 0.21 - 0.42 
Mean 0.10 0.14 
Mean 0.10 0.14 
Table 2 shows the country scores for the derived company working time flexibility com-
ponents (factors), without having controlled for the company level characteristics. The higher 
the score, the higher the probability of the country having companies with more flexibility 
options for workers or companies. As we can see from Table 3, the northern European coun-
tries, that is Finland, Sweden and Denmark along with Poland and somewhat the Netherlands 
are the countries where there are companies with high scores for the flexibility for worker’s 
component. UK, Sweden and Germany are the countries where the flexibility for companies 
component score is high on average. For both components, it is the southern European coun-
                                                 
10 Summary of factor scores 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WTF for workers 15787 0.10 1.01 -1.63 2.21
WTF for companies 15787 0.14 1.05 -2.27 2.46
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tries, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Cyprus along with Slovenia, where the lowest average 
scores are found. Other countries are in between the two country groups, but in general we 
can see that countries where one component score is high the other tends to be high as well 
and visa versa. 
 
3.2  Country level explanatory variables 
In this section we operationalize the various theories examined in section 2 and go into 
detail about the data used as indicators for each country characteristic. In this section, the 
theories are grouped into four different categories. First, the labour market institution, second 
labour relations, thus union strength and bargaining structures, third, the economic, labour 
market situations which includes from the previous section, labour market situation, economic 
globalization, prevalence of the public and service sectors, and lastly gender regime. The de-
scriptive table of the indicators is in the Annex. 
 
Labour market regulation 
For a measurement of labour market institutions we use the Employment Protection Leg-
islation index (EPL) provided by the OECD, which refers to the regulations that concern hir-
ing and firing of workers on both permanent and temporary contracts (OECD, 1999:50). EPL 
index for regular workers concerns the costs for employers when firing workers on regular 
contracts, while EPL for temporary workers refers to the regulations concerning hiring prac-
tices. There are many critiques on the use of EPL indexes (Bertola et al., 1999; Boeri et al., 
2000). For example, in many countries collective labour agreements in either the sector or 
company level may change the strictness of the regulations derived from laws (Schils 2007) 
resulting in the EPL index not truly representing the strictness or regulations companies have 
to adapt to. However, it is the most commonly available data comparable across many coun-
tries. For these reasons, it is one of the most used indicators to measure flexibility of the coun-
try or to represent the rigidity of the labour market institution of a country (e.g. Pissarides, 
1990; Layard et al, 1991; Nickell, 1997; Esping- Andersen, 2000; Regini, 2000; EC, 2006; 
Muffels, 2007).  
In this study we use the EPL for regular workers and EPL for temporary workers. There 
are no indexes that are readily available to use as proxies to measure the strictness of labour 
market institutions on working time across countries. It is possible to use proxies such as the 
regulation on working hours such as limitations in the law on overtime or annualization of 
hours, definitions used for unusual hours etc. For leave schemes we can examine the existence 
and generosity of various leave schemes in the institutions. However, these will all be proxies 
measuring one of the various working time arrangements to represent a whole group of op-
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tions, so they are not used here. However, we use EPL indices also as proxies that indicate, in 
a more lose way, the strictness of labour market institutions in general, presupposing that 
countries that have stringent regulations on firing and hiring workers will also have more 
stringent working time regulations.  
 
Labour relations 
There are three different factors relating to bargaining institutions that must be taken into 
consideration when examining labour relations of a country. They are union density, collec-
tive bargaining coverage rate and centralization of bargaining. Centralization describes ‘the 
locus of the formal structure of wage bargaining’ (OECD, 1997:70). It describes the level 
where wage bargaining and negotiations take place, and it varies from company or plant lev-
els to central, national level negotiation by peak organizations.  
Both trade union density and collective bargaining coverage rate represent the union 
strength at the bargaining table. Union density is the percentage of workers that have mem-
bership in the union, and here it refers to ‘net’ members excluding those who are non- active 
(OECD, 2004b:144). Collective bargaining coverage rate measures the extent ‘salaried work-
ers are subject to union- negotiated terms and conditions in employment’ (OECD, 
2004b:146). The relationship between the two measures is complex. Traditionally, union 
membership is used as the prime measure of the power base of unions and their capacity for 
collective action (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Korpi, 1983; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999). How-
ever, many countries have administrative rules and extensions of wage agreements that sup-
plement union representation in wage bargaining (Scarpetta, 1996:54; Buti et al., 1998:24), 
making it unnecessary for workers to become actual members of the union. For this reason the 
collective bargaining coverage rate can be perceived as a better measurement of union power. 
On the other hand, Buti et al. note that the difference between the two can be interpreted as 
“artificial union power” meaning the strength of unions which is not based on unions’ ability 
to gain support from workers, such as membership (Buti et al. 1998: 24). Centralization and 
collective bargaining coverage rates are correlated in the sense that high coverage rates indi-
cate more workers are covered by agreements bargained usually at the more central, national 
or industry, level rather than through individual agreements. This brings problems of multi-
collinerarity when both centralization and collective bargaining coverage is taken in the 
model. For this reason, we include union membership and centralization in our model to ex-
amine the effect of union strength and centralization separately.  
Here we use the data gathered by the European Foundation (2007) which gives informa-
tion for the net trade union density in 2004, collective bargaining coverage rate is from 2002, 
and the centralization index which indicates at which level wage bargaining takes place (for 
specific methodology see European Commission, 2004:41 ). 
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Economic and labour market situation 
To examine labour demand and supply or the labour market situation of the country, we 
use the unemployment rate for the past five years. This will indicate the general trend in de-
mand and supply in the labour market of the previous years. We can measure economic glob-
alization through the inflow and outflow of capital and goods. These can be measured by for-
eign direct investment as a percentage of GDP and trade of goods and services as a percentage 
of GDP, the former as a proxy of flow of capital and latter flow of goods and services. Al-
though the two indicators are both measurement of the extent to which the country is exposed 
or relies on global markets, the former also can be used as an indication to the extent the for-
eign companies are established in the country, which may change the work culture of the 
country. 
As the measurement for the prevalence of the public sector, we have aggregated at the 
country level the number of companies which have answered that they are within the public 
sector from the ESWT data set, thus arriving at the percentage of companies that are within 
the public sector. We have weighted this number by the employee weight, which takes the size 
of each company into account, which results in the amount of employees employed in public 
companies. Using the data from ESWT brings continuity in the definition of being within the 
public sector. Deindustrialization or the prevalence of the service sector is measured here as 
the percentage of service sector employment as a percentage of dependent employment. All 
data used from economic and labour market situation is from Eurostat, with the exception of 
prevalence of the public sector. 
 
Gender regime 
There is no widely accepted grouping of countries to indicate their gender regime typol-
ogy that shows which carer-earner model the country is. We can use other proxies such as 
female labour market participation to indicate the gender division of work. In this paper we 
use female activity rate average for 2001 to 2005 from Eurostat. This indicates the amount of 
women participating in the labour market thus showing the extent to which they are earners. 
This does not take into account the differences in women participating in the labour market 
part-time and those participating full-time, which does not distinguish between 1.5-earner 
household countries with two-earner household countries. In addition, women’s participation 
in the labour market may not necessarily mean they are relieved from being carers of house-
holds. Using data across 27 European countries, Burchell et al. (2007) show that even when 
women work full-time, there are still unequal distributions of unpaid working hours between 
men and women (Burchell et al., 2007:36). However for the current analysis we believe that 
labour participation rates provide sufficient distinction between countries and their gender 
regime characters. 
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Table 3: Summary of the variables and main hypotheses of this paper  
 Variable Effect on working time flexibility 
for workers 
Effect on working time flexibility 
for companies 
Institutions: EPL regu-
lar workers, temporary 
workers 
Negative : consistency between regu-
lations and practice 
Negative: complimentary of exter-
nal flexibility and internal flexibil-
ity, consistency between regulation 
and practice  
Positive: substitution effect between 
external and internal flexibility  
Union strength Positive: strong unions  for better 
working conditions 
Negative: strong unions 
against/block use of flexibility det-
rimental to workers 
Centralization Positive: centralization means more 
ability of unions to advance their in-
terests 
Negative: decentralized countries have 
more flexicurity policies 
Positive: centralization makes 
countries’ social partners to inter-
nalize costs  
Negative: decentralization more 
power of employers to advance 
their interests 
Labour demand: 
unemployment rate 
Negative: enhanced worker’s negotia-
tion power when low, or no need to 
provide WLB options for worker re-
cruitment strategy when high 
Positive: enhanced employer’s ne-
gotiation power 
Negative: no need to use flexible 
hours to adapt to labour shortage 
Globalization: FDI, 
trade 
Negative: increased competition, loss 
of negotiation power or workers 
?: importing company cultures of the 
head quarters 
Positive: increased competition, 
lean production, increased negotia-
tion power of employers 
Prevalence of public 
sector 
Positive: public sector driven work 
culture 
Negative?: public sector driven 
work culture  
Prevalence of service 
sector 
Positive?: service sector driven work 
organization 
Positive: service sector driven work 
organization 
Gender regime: fema-
le participation 
Positive: WLB to facilitate female 
participation 
-  
?: indicates hypothesis where the direction of the relationship is uncertain 
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4  Outcomes11 
This section examines the outcomes of the analyses. Firstly, we examine the amount of 
variance in the country level to be explained. Using the multi- level model, we can explain to 
what extent countries explain for the company level working time flexibility practices (level 
2, country level variance) even when we control for various company and sector characteris-
tics. Afterwards, the variables listed in the previous section are tested to see how they explain 
for this variance separately and then in combination, thus controlled for other characteristics.  
 
4.1 Country level variance 
In this section, we examine the country variances that need to be explained from our 
models. First, we examine the variance explained by the country level without having taken 
account of (controlling for) the company level characteristics. Here we examine the variance 
explained by three levels, the country, sector and the company. Although the sector can also 
be considered one of the company characteristics, it can also be considered a level, especially 
when we consider the various negotiations and policies made at the sector level. The empty 
model can be shown as the following equation. Here y indicates the factor scores for each 
company (i), embedded in sectors (j), and countries (k). As we can see from the equation, the 
error terms for each factor scores are divided into three levels, thus the company, sector and 
country. The proportion of variance distributed to each level is thus calculated as the equation 
below.  The same method applies to the proportion for sector and company levels as well and 
they result as the graph shown in Figure 2. 
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11 All outcomes are available upon request. 
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Figure 2:Variance explained by country, sector and company levels for the working time 
flexibility components 
 
As we can see for both of the two working time components company characteristics or 
company level attributes play the most important role, explaining approximately 76% of all 
variance for both components. For the worker’s working time flexibility component, the 
country level takes up approximately 17% of all variance, whereas sector takes up only 7%. 
On the other hand, for company’s working time flexibility component, the country level can 
explain only 9% of all variance whereas now, the sector level explains approximately 15% of 
the variance.  
 
Box: Control variables: company level characteristics: 
1) Sector – 13 category – reference: manufacturing 
            2) public vs. private sector 
3) Company size – 6 categories12 
4) Composition13 – proportion of female workers – 5 categories  
       “   skilled workers – 5 categories  
       “   younger workers (younger than 30) – 
                         5 categories 
      “   older workers (older than 50) – 5 categories 
 5) Collective agreement on working time – dummy 
 6) Existence of employee representative body – dummy 
                                                 
12 10 to19, 20 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 199, 200 to 499, 500 or more.  
13 Less than 20%, 20% to less than 40%, 40% to less than 60%, 60% to less than 80%, 80% or more.  
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 7) Workload variation – daily – dummy 
           weekly – dummy 
           seasonal – dummy 
 8) Economic situation of the company – 4 scale14 
 9) Use of temporary contracts - dummy 
           10) Use of work-life balance facilities15 – dummy 
 
Outcomes: 
The outcome of this analysis is as follows. For the flexibility component for workers, service sectors 
usually have higher scores compared to manufacturing and other industry sectors, with the exception 
of hotel and restaurants sectors, and the education and financial intermediation sectors having the 
highest scores. On the other hand, the flexibility component for companies, there was no clear cut 
division between service and industry sectors. Construction sector along with financial intermediation 
have the lowest scores, whereas hotel and restaurants and health and social work have the highest. In 
both accounts, bigger companies, with higher proportion of females, have higher flexibility component 
scores. However, whereas the one for workers firms with a high proportion of skilled workers show 
higher scores. On the other hand, the one for companies, firms with a high proportion of younger 
workers have higher scores and firms with a high proportion of skilled workers have lower scores. 
Companies with collective agreements on working time, an employee representative, temporary work-
ers, work-life balance facilities score high in both components. Variation of work load is also impor-
tant but variation in the shorter term is important for flexibility for companies, whereas variation in the 
longer term is important for flexibility for workers. Companies in good or better economic situations 
seem to have more work life balance oriented working time flexibility within their firms. The effect of 
being within the public sector did not have a significant relationship with either of the flexibility com-
ponents, however, this relationship varies between countries.  
 
This variance changes when we take the compositional effect of the company level vari-
ables into account, in other words, if we control for the various company level characteristics 
and examine the pure differences between companies that share all other characteristics that 
may affect their working time flexibility practices but only differ in which country it is lo-
cated in. The simplified version of this equation is as below. Here Xij indicates the company 
level explanatory variables, used here as control variables (see box for details), and Xj indi-
cates country level explanatory variables. In the initial, empty model no Xj variables are in-
cluded. Here the country variance proportion is the one left when company characteristics in 
the box are controlled for and the effect of being within the public sector is allowed to vary 
across country. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 Very bad, quite bad, quite good, very bad. 
15 Here, they are kindergarten and crèche, other professional help for children, professional help for household 
management, other facilities. 
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Note: i: company level, j: country level  
β0 = coefficient for constant, β13 = coefficient for effect of being a public sector company 
u: country level error,  e: company level error 
This model allows for random slopes for the effect of being within the public sector (β13) across countries.  
 
country  var  proportion =
country variance of constant+ country variance of being a public sector 
country variance of constant+ country variance of being a public sector +left company level variance(error)
 
 
The variance after taken sector and other company level variables into account, was 18% of 
all unexplained variance for worker’s flexibility related WTF component, and 16% of all un-
explained variance for company’s flexibility related WTF component16. This is the variance 
we are trying to explain through the numerous theories noted in the previous sections. 
 
                                                 
16 In this analysis, sector is taken as a company level fixed effect and not as a separate level. The reasons for this 
is because sectors are cannot be seen as a random grouping nor is it a sample coming from a bigger distribu-
tion of sectors. The 13 sectors are of a fixed nature and are exhaustive of all sectors that can exist, for these 
reasons we use them as fixed effects. Also, here the key focus is on the country level, so using sector as a 
separate level will not add any information. In addition this variance is the variance when the effect of being 
within the public sector was allowed to vary across countries (random slope), thus adding more variance 
across countries. 
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Figure 3: Variance left after taken composition effects (company characteristics) into 
the model + cross national differences in the effect of being within the public sector 
  
Country level variables: taken separately 
Now, we include the various indicators listed above separately to see their effect in ex-
plaining the variance of the company level working time flexibility. As we can see from the 
Table 4, only few variables are shown to have positive effects on the working time flexibility 
component scores. Firstly, when we examine the effect on the worker’s flexibility related 
WTF component EPL for temporary workers is negatively related to the worker’s WTF com-
ponent. On the other hand, the size of the public sector, female activity rate and union density 
are positively related to the worker’s flexibility component. For companies WTF, EPL for 
temporary workers as well as regular workers come out as having negative relationships, 
whereas the size of the public sector comes also as having a positive relationship and here 
service sector employment also seems to be positively related to the use of various company 
need oriented working time options. From this outcome we can see that countries where the 
regulations for the use of temporary workers are less stringent, there seems to be more use of 
working time flexibility in the company for both workers and companies, thus suggesting a 
complementary effect. The relationship we find between EPL for regular workers and WTF 
components albeit not big, confirms this theory. However, when we consider that this effect 
holds when the use or non use of temporary contracts within the companies are controlled for, 
it can also be the case that both of the EPL indices here represent less stringent rules on the 
labour market policies in general. In this case we can interpret the outcomes as countries 
where there are less restrictive labour market institutions there are more flexibility in the prac-
tices as well, thus showing somewhat of a consistency between institution and practice.  
In countries where there is a prevalence of public sectors, there seems to be more use of 
WTF arrangements for both companies and workers but the relationship is stronger for the 
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latter case. This confirms the theory examined in the previous section, however what the rela-
tionship between public sector prevalence and company oriented WTF means is yet to be 
concluded. Companies in de-industrialized countries seem to have on average more WTF ar-
rangements for companies’ needs as well, regardless of the fact that they are within the ser-
vice sector or the industry sector, which confirms our hypothesis. Countries with strong un-
ions seem to have companies with more WLB related working time options. This is also the 
case for countries with more females participating in the labour market, which confirms our 
hypothesis that worker’s WTF component scores will be high in countries where there are 
more needs to facilitate women in the labour market. Although this could also imply that 
those countries where on average more work life balance oriented working time flexibility 
options are provided, women participate more in the labour market. In addition, we can see 
that countries where bargaining is done at the central level, there are more working time 
flexibility usages for both workers and companies. However, this relationship is not signifi-
cant, and changes when we control for various country level characteristics as we will see in 
the next section. 
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Table 4: Effect of various country level characteristics taken separately 
 
Worker’s flex 
WTF 
variance 
 (% explained 
/ left variance)
Company’s 
flex WTF 
variance 
(% explained/ 
variance) 
Empty model a  0 165  0 133 
EPL regular (-) 11 147 (-)* 8 123 
EPL temporary (-)*** 27 120 (-)** 14 115 
Union density (+)* 10 149 (+) 2 131 
Centralization (+) 3 160 (+) 7 124 
Unemployment average (+) 4 159 (0) 0 133 
FDI as % of GDP (0) 2 162 (0) 0 133 
Trade as % of GDP (0) 0 165 (0) 5 127 
Public sector size (+)*** 30 116 (+)* 13 116 
Service sector employment (0) 0 165 (+)** 20 106 
Female active rate average (+)*** 21 130 (+) 9 121 
a: controlling for company level characters and allowing variance between countries in the effect of being within 
the public sector 
*: significant at the 0.1 level, ** : significant at the 0.05 level, ***: significant at the 0.01 level 
Note: When EPL is taken Luxembourg and Cyprus is excluded from the analysis. 
 
Country variables: taken all together 
The relationship we find when the country level variables are taken separately can show 
us how various country level characteristics affect WTF components individually.  However, 
the relationships found can be driven by other factors which are correlated to the variable. In 
the model where all the variables are put in together, we are essentially examining the effect 
of the variable, after taking all the other country level characteristics into account. In other 
words, we are testing each theory controlling for other characteristics, thus finding the added 
value/effect on WTF components purely due to the changes in the specific country level vari-
able. This approach also allows us to test the robustness of the model. 
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When we include all indicators that represent country characteristics into the model, we 
are able to find more significant results in comparison to the single indicator model in Table 
4. For worker’s flexibility WTFs, the indicators combined explain for approximately 66% of 
the variance in the country level. All of the indicators that were significant individually were 
found to be significant even when other country level variables were controlled for, with the 
exception of the size of the public sector which loses its significance. This may have to do 
with the fact that female activity rate is correlated to the size of the public sector (See Annex 
3) and the former cancels out the latter when put in the model together. The effect of union 
density on the use of various worker-oriented WTF is stronger when other country level vari-
ables have been taken into account. There are additional indices which turn out to be signifi-
cant after other variables are controlled for. The effect of labour market situations on the use 
of the worker’s flexibility WTF component shows the opposite result from our hypothesis, 
that high unemployment is positively related to more use of worker oriented WTF. Countries 
with high unemployment seem to have more workers oriented WTF. However, this may have 
to do with the relationship between other variables, such as union density and trade average, 
both of which are negatively correlated to unemployment averages. We can also think of 
situations where companies use leaves, which take up a great majority of the worker-oriented 
WTF, as buffers instead of dismissals. In other words, when there is high demand for goods 
and when there are labour shortages companies may not be able to provide as many leaves 
since there are is no excess labour. However, when the opposite is the case, then companies 
may encourage workers to take (un-paid) leaves until economic situations improve. Lastly, it 
can be due to reverse causality, where the use of worker oriented WTF decreases demand for 
workers. Also, economic globalization as in percentage of trade comes out as being positively 
related to worker flexibility related WTF, which is contrary to our hypothesis. This may be 
due to the fact that small countries that are relatively well off, such as Luxembourg, Belgium, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Austria, have more exposure to globalization and higher trade 
proportions. This may imply that globalization may enhance competition in the country, but 
may have different implications for different countries of different economic development 
levels. Also it can be due to reverse causality where countries with more worker oriented 
flexibility options were able to facilitate increase in trade more than others. Although the rela-
tionship is insignificant, we can see that the direction of the relationship between worker-
oriented WTF and centralization of bargaining has changed. As we can see when we control 
for other country level variables, countries with decentralized bargaining are now the ones 
with more worker-oriented WTF.  
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Table 5: Regression outcome with all country level variables  
Dependent Worker’s flexibility Company’s flexibility 
EPL regular  -  0.002(0.072) -  0.093(0.103) 
EPL temporary -  0.159(0.043)*** -  0.145(0.062)** 
Union density   0.839(0.233)*** -  0.812(0.338)*** 
Centralization -  0.415(0.278)   0.689(0.405)* 
Unemployment average   0.068(0.016)***   0.048(0.022)** 
FDI as % of GDP   0.000(0.025) -  0.040(0.037) 
Trade as % of GDP   0.006(0.003)**   0.007(0.005) 
Public sector size   0.000(0.004)   0.001(0.006) 
Service sector employment   0.004(0.008)   0.032(0.012)*** 
Female activity rate   0.015(0.007)**   0.019(0.010)* 
Remaining country variance 56 (66% explained) 51 (62% explained) 
*: significant at the 0.1 level, **: significant at the 0.05 level, ***: significant at the 0.01 level 
Note: of the company characteristics public sector effect was allowed to vary across countries for both factors  
Companies in Luxembourg and Cyprus are excluded in this analysis 
 
For companies flexibility approximately 62% of the total country variance is explained by 
the use of all country level characteristics. In addition, the effect found in Table 4 for the EPL 
for temporary workers as well as service sector size is confirmed in the combined model. 
However, the size of the public sector, which was significant when taken separately cease to 
be significant in the latter model just as the case for worker’s WTF. On the other hand, unem-
ployment rate as well as union density and centralization all comes out as having significant 
effects to the use of company’s need driven WTF options. The relationship between unem-
ployment rates and company WTF component scores implies that in times of labour demand 
shortage there may be a shift in negotiation powers towards the employers for them to negoti-
ate working conditions, thus increasing the use of company-oriented WTF options. In addi-
tion, we find that countries where net union density is low, thus a country where most proba-
bly the unions are weak, companies use more company oriented WTF options than in coun-
tries where the union power is strong, which correspond to the conclusion we get from the 
worker-oriented WTF component. Where bargaining is centralized there are more options for 
companies’ flexibility even when other things, such as union density, are controlled for. This 
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may indicate the ability of the centralized coordinated systems to adapt to needs of flexibility 
better than the decentralized systems. However, this may also imply that centralized bargain-
ing countries have more full-time working hours as the norm, where flexibility is used 
through over-time. Lastly, when all variables are taken in together, female employment rates 
are also positively correlated to the companies’ WTF component scores.  
 
Country variables: Best fit model? 
Next we derive a model only including the significant variables into the model, thus in-
creasing our degree of freedom, and increasing the adjusted fit of the model.  
 
Table 6: Regression outcome with only significant country variables  
Dependent Worker’s flexibility Company’s flexibility  Company’s flexibility 
EPL regular     
EPL temporary -  0.159(0.035)*** - 0.220(0.049)*** -  0.209(0.055)*** 
Union density    0.890(0.189)*** - 0.605(0.302)**  
Centralization -  0.460(0.243)*   0.782(0.343)**  
Unemployment average    0.068(0.010)***   0.051(0.016)***    0.038(0.017)** 
FDI as % of GDP    
Trade as % of GDP    0.006(0.002)***   
Public sector size    
Service sector employment    0.030(0.006)***    0.030(0.007)*** 
Female activity rate    0.016(0.005)***   0.010(0.007)  
Remaining country variance 58 (65%) 56 (58%) 69 (48%) 
*: significant at the 0.1 level, ** : significant at the 0.05 level, ***: significant at the 0.01 level 
Note: of the company characteristics public sector effect was allowed to vary across countries for both factors  
Companies in Luxembourg and Cyprus are excluded in this analysis 
For the model for worker’s WTF component, we do not lose much explained variance of 
the model even when we exclude the non-significant variables from the model. Of the country 
variance in the empty model, we have explained for 65% of it through the model with only 
significant variables. All variables also increase their significance of the relationship, al-
though the size of the effect does not change much. In addition, we can see that now the rela-
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tionship between centralization becomes significant. For the model for the company’s WTF 
component, we arrive at two models. Firstly the one with all the significant variables in the 
model in Table 4, we lose a bit of explained variance, in addition to that female activity rate 
ceases to have a significant relationship with this component. Also, unlike the model for 
worker’s WTF component, there seems to be changes in the size of the effect of the signifi-
cant variables. The effect of EPL for temporary workers, centralization and somewhat unem-
ployment becomes even stronger and the effect of union density and somewhat service sector 
employment becomes weaker. An interesting point about this model is that the union vari-
ables are only significant when female activity rate is included. When female activity rate is 
taken out, what we arrive at is the model in the far right, where only EPL temporary, unem-
ployment and service sector employment is significant. However, in this model, the explained 
variance decreases to only 48% of the total variance.  
 
Table 7: Summary of outcomes 
Effect on working time flexibility 
for workers 
Effect on working time flexibility for 
companies 
Variable 
separately combined separately combined 
EPL regular wor-
kers 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
EPL temporary 
workers 
- - - - 
Union density + + n.s. - 
Centralization n.s. n.s. / - n.s. + 
Unemployment rate  n.s. + (?) n.s. + 
Globalization: FDI n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Globalization: trade n.s. + (?) n.s. n.s. 
Size of public sector + n.s. + n.s. 
Size of service sec-
tor 
n.s. n.s. + + 
Female activity rate + + n.s. +/ n.s. 
Note: n.s = non significant, +: positive effect, - : negative effect  
(?): indicate results that are against the set hypothesis 
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In conclusion, we can summarize the outcomes as the following. EPL can explain the dif-
ferences in the practices of working time in European companies, however, it is rather the 
EPL for temporary workers not so much the EPL for regular workers. For both flexibility 
components, taken separately and together, the relationship found is negative, thus indicating 
that countries with relaxed rules on using temporary work contracts companies use more wor-
king time options. However, if we predict that countries with less stringent regulations on the 
use of temporary contracts may also less stringent rules on the labour market, including those 
on working time, this result may be read as countries where institutions are deregulated, there 
is more flexibility in the companies. However, this must be tested with the exact working time 
regulation proxies to make further conclusions. Countries with strong unions, measured here 
as union density have companies with more worker-oriented working time flexibility, and less 
company-oriented working time flexibility, also when the level of bargaining and other 
country characteristics are controlled for. When union density and other country variables are 
controlled for, the companies in decentralized countries have more worker-oriented flexibility 
options whereas the companies in countries with centralized bargaining have more company-
oriented flexibility options. Companies in countries with high unemployment rates seem to 
have both high use of worker and company-oriented flexibility, when other country characte-
ristics are controlled for. Countries that have higher share of trade in their economy seem to 
have companies that provide more worker-oriented flexibility options, when other country 
characteristics are taken as constant. Companies in countries with larger public sectors have 
more both worker-oriented and company-oriented flexibility, however this effect ceases to 
exist when other country characteristics are taken into account. Companies in countries with 
larger service sectors seem to use more company-oriented flexibility options, regardless of 
whether or not the other country characteristics are taken into account. Lastly, in countries 
with high activity rates for females in their labour market, companies seem to provide more 
worker-oriented flexibility, regardless of the proportion of female workers they themselves 
employ. 
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5  Conclusions, policy implications and issues for future research  
This paper examines the key determinants that explain the variance between countries in 
their use of various working time flexibility arrangements, divided into those for workers and 
those for companies. We find that institutions as well as market structures and situations are 
important in explaining the practices of working time flexibility. In other words, we cannot 
explain the differences between company practices just through one or the other, but can only 
explain it through the combination of several factors which interact with each other. Labour 
market institutions including Employment Protection Legislation, union strength and collec-
tive bargaining structures are significant factors that explain the country differences in the use 
of various working time options. However, we can see that labour market situations and struc-
tures, such as unemployment situations, globalization trends, deindustrialization and women’s 
participation in the labour markets are also important in explaining working time flexibility.  
Based on the study we can come to the following policy conclusions. First, we can see 
that there is still room for policy changes in enhancing or reducing the developments of flexi-
bility. As we can see from the effects of EPL on both flexibility components, regulations are 
influential in changing behaviours of companies. However, it is still not clear exactly which 
regulations EPL is representing here, especially because other regulations have not been in-
cluded in the model. Additional labour market institutions, especially working time regula-
tions, as well as other regulations such as product market regulations, another type of regula-
tion that is frequently examined in the field of institutional economics as well as in the topic 
of flexibility, should be tested to measure the accurate impacts. This would enable use to see 
exactly what types of policies are indeed influential and which are not as well as what kinds 
of results we can expect from their combinations.  
Second, this paper finds that bargaining characters, such as union density and centraliza-
tion affect working time flexibility practices of companies. The results show that density and 
centralization have opposite effects on the two working time flexibility components. Coun-
tries with decentralized bargaining and stronger unions with higher worker oriented flexibility 
component scores, while countries with centralized bargaining and weaker unions have higher 
companies oriented flexibility component scores. This implies that there are certain negotia-
tion structures that may facilitate certain types of flexibility developments. In addition, despite 
the notion that centralized bargaining and strong union memberships go hand in hand result-
ing in similar outcomes, here we see that in fact decentralized but strong unions are those that 
yield better outcomes for their workers in terms of providing more work-life balance flexibil-
ity options. This also needs to be investigated in more detail, especially in relations to other 
variables that may be affected by bargaining power structures, such as EPL, unemployment 
and globalization.  
Third, there are implications for female labour market participation and worker-oriented 
flexibility. Thus, although the causality of the relationship needs to be investigated in more 
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detail, the outcomes imply that the enhancement of worker-oriented flexibility used within 
companies may actually enhance women’s participation in the labour market. This notion is 
not new and has already been noted numerously in the fields of HR management and others. 
However, this study only examines the relationship between female activity rates with the use 
of worker-oriented flexibility. This should be elaborated further to see which types of female 
labour market participation, i.e. full-time, part-time, shorter-part-time, can result from various 
worker-oriented flexibility. Furthermore, the relationship between different types of options 
of the worker-oriented flexibility components and the different types of female labour market 
participation should be examined as well. 
Lastly, there are still some results that are difficult to interpret and go against the set hy-
potheses. These are the effect of unemployment rates and globalization on the worker oriented 
flexibility component. Although we can think of a reverse causality, it may also be outcomes 
of interactions between country level variables thus a result of another variable, perhaps un-
observed in the model. However, this also needs further investigations for any conclusions to 
be made.  
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7 Annexes 
[Annex 1] Factor analysis outcomes 
 
Table. Factor analysis, varimax rotation three factor outcome 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Communalities 
Care leave 0.82 0.11 0.01 0.68 
Education leave 0.83 0.07 0.05 0.69 
Other leave 0.70 0.05 0.01 0.49 
Over time  - 0.01 0.22 0.36 0.18 
Unusual hours - 0.01 0.05 0.80 0.65 
Shift work 0.07 0.02 0.79 0.63 
Phase retirement 0.07 0.41 - 0.02 0.17 
Flexible working schemes 0.01 0.72 0.07 0.53 
Part time work 0.23 0.60 0.02 0.41 
Reduce working hours 0.14 0.72 0.05 0.54 
Explained variance: 49.8% 
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Table. Factor analysis, varimax rotation two factors outcome 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Communalities 
Care leave 0.79 0.00 0.63 
Education leave 0.78 0.01 0.61 
Other leave 0.66 - 0.02 0.44 
Over time  0.01 0.42 0.18 
Unusual hours - 0.13 0.66 0.45 
Shift work - 0.06 0.63 0.39 
Phase retirement 0.42 0.36 0.31 
Flexible working schemes 0.20 0.24 0.10 
Part time work 0.25 0.50 0.31 
Reduce working hours 0.37 0.47 0.36 
Explained variance: 37.7% 
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Here communalities represent the extent to which the factors explain for each variable. The higher the communality score, the better the variable 
is explained by the factor (R- square). As we can see, the use of overtime and flexible working schemes is not explained much by the two factors 
derived here in this analysis. 
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[Annex 2] Country level indicators 
 
EPL 
regular 
workers 
2003a  
EPL 
temporary 
workers 
2003 a 
Unemploy
ment rate 
2001~2005 
b 
FDI as % 
of GDP b 
trade as 
% of 
GDP b 
Size of 
public 
sector b 
Size of svc 
sector b 
female 
activity 
rate b 
net trade 
union den-
sity 2004 b 
collective 
bargaining 
coverage rate 
2002b 
centraliza-
tion of 
bargaining 
a 
Belgium 1.7 2.6 7.8 9.3 80.9 20.7 76.5 56.6 49 96 0.61
Denmark 1.5 1.4 5.0 3.8 43.8 36.4 75.1 75.5 80 83 0.54
Germany 2.7 1.8 8.7 1.2 34.8 27.7 70.7 65.0 18 65 0.47
Greece 2.4 3.3 10.2 0.8 26.7 16.9 61.1 52.3 20 65 0.39
Spain 2.6 3.5 10.5 4.1 28.3 17.5 64.6 54.6 16 81 0.38
France 2.5 3.6 9.2 3.7 26.1 33.0 75.2 63.3 8 90 0.17
Ireland 1.6 0.6 4.4 5.7 79.8 21.6 65.5 57.9 38 - 0.64
Italy 1.8 2.1 8.4 1.3 25.4 22.7 66.7 48.9 34 70 0.34
Luxembourg - -  3.6 355.3 122.0 11.4 76.9 54.4 46 58 0.33
Netherlands 3.1 1.2 3.6 8.5 60.0 45.9 78.5 68.5 25 81 0.58
Austria 2.4 1.5 4.4 2.5 52.7 9.1 64.3 63.8 33 98 0.71
Portugal 4.2 2.8 5.9 3.1 30.9 12.3 55.0 66.2 17 87 0.30
Finland 2.2 1.9 8.9 2.7 36.0 29.0 68.3 74.2 71 90 0.57
Sweden 2.9 1.6 5.8 4.5 42.0 42.2 74.7 76.0 77 92 0.56
UK 1.1 0.4 4.9 3.6 27.6 25.3 75.2 68.2 29 35 0.13
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Czech Rep 3.3 0.4 7.9 3.8 66.2 37.8 57.2 62.5 22 35 0.27
Cyprus - -  4.3 6.0 50.0 19.8 74.3 62.2 70 68 0.26
Latvia 2.3 2.1 11.0 1.8 49.2 43.2 60.7 64.6 16 20 0.30
Hungary 1.9 1.1 6.1 3.2 66.9 15.3 61.1 53.4 17 42 0.26
Poland 2.2 1.3 18.9 1.7 33.8 45.7 52.4 58.7 17 35 0.20
Slovenia 2.7 2.3 6.4 2.1 57.8 29.6 52.9 64.0 44 100 0.43
Mean 2.3 1.9 8.5 3.5 35.6 27.9 68.6 62.0 25 66 0.34
Standard D. 0.7 1.1 3.5 13.5 13.8 9.2 7.3 7.0 16 21 0.16
a: index scores 
b: percentages 
Source: OECD(2004), EUROSTAT, ESWT, European Foundation(2007)
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[Annex 3] Correlation table of country level indicators 
| EPLreg EPLtemp Unemp ave FDI ave Trade ave Public size Svc emp Fem act density central
EPL temp 0.31          
Unemployment average 0.01 0.30         
FDI average - 0.01 - 0.07 - 0.18        
Trade average - 0.03 - 0.40 - 0.37 0.54       
Size of public sector 0.03 - 0.30 0.29 - 0.18 - 0.06      
Service sector employment average - 0.38 - 0.03 - 0.50 0.18 0.10 0.16     
Female activity rate 0.14 - 0.33 - 0.34 - 0.13 - 0.06 0.47 0.35    
Union density - 0.28 - 0.26 - 0.36 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.37 0.52   
Centralization  0.07 - 0.04 - 0.34 - 0.03 0.37 - 0.07 0.22 0.25 0.53  
CB coverage rate 0.27 0.55 - 0.30 - 0.06 - 0.01 - 0.22 0.30 0.21 0.37 0.64
Note: all correlations are significant at the 0.001 level, with the exception of EPL reg with unemployment average and EPL reg with FDI average, both of which are not statis-
tically significant 
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